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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT NO. 36322-2009 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
VS. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents. ) 
) 
CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
in and for the County of Ada 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Attorney for Plaintif£'Respondent!Cross 
Appellant Pamela Stephen 
Gary 1. Quigley 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1296 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Attorney for Defendant! Appellant!Cross-
Respondents Sallaz, and Defendants/Cross-
Respondents Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD., 
and Scott Gatewood 
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CROSS-APPElLlLANT'S REBUTTAlL ARGUMENT 
A. Tllne Record Olll Appelill Establishes The GlJIlardYalll Ad Utelllll Costs Were ReasoJmalMe 
Allld Neces§lIlriny IlllclJIlrred. 
In response to this issue, the Appellant and Cross-Respondents (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Sallaz") argue the Ms. Stephen failed to establish the discretionary costs requested 
were reasonable and necessary. " ... [T]here is no support in the record on this appeal that this 
guardian ad litem costs (sic) was necessary and exceptional as required by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).,,1 
Sallaz is mistsken. 
First, the guardian ad litem costs were necessary and exceptional because the Court 
ordered Mr. Wallace to act as Ms. Stephen's guardian, and did so after conducting a hearing on 
February 26, 2007. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Motion of Plaintiff s 
Counsel, on behalf of the Plaintiff, for an Order appointing a Guardian Ad Litem for 
the Plaintiff. The Court conducted a hearing on February 26, 2007, according to 
notice. Present were the Plaintiff, her counsel Eric Clark, the Defendants' counsel 
William Schwartz, and the proposed guardian, attomey Robert Wallace. 
The Court understands that this is a matter in which it has discretion. In 
applying its discretion, the Court, upon review of the record, including the 
Complaint that was signed and filed by the Plaintiff pro se in which she alleges she 
had been hospitalized for "mental illness," is persuaded that such an appointment is 
necessary to ensure the Plaintiff s interests are fully protected in this case. 
Additionally, the Defendants had not filed a written objection to this motion and 
the Court questions whether the Defendants have legal standing to object. 
Plaintiff s Counsel has proposed the appointment of attorney Robert 
Wallace as guardian. The Court has reviewed Mr. Wallace's affidavit and attached 
Resume and is confident Mr. Wallace understands and will carry out his duties as 
guardian ad litem. 
I. Cross-Respondents' Brief, page 15. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the motion of 
Plaintiff's Counsel seeking a Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, Attorney Robert Wallace is appointed as 
Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen concerning all issues 
arising in this case and will serve in that capacity until relieved by this Court.2 
Moreover, in his Findings of Facts, Judge McLaughlin stated: 
Though this Court cannot make a finding from the evidence presented in this case 
that the Plaintiff was impaired to the point she was incompetent, the Court can find 
from the evidence the Plaintiff was not in a state of mind to comprehend all of the 
issues she was facing in this litigation in a knowing and intelligent manner. 
When a client has been involuntarily hospitalized and the client's attorney 
has had to go to the client's home to communicate with that client on ten occasions, 
there is obviously a problem that should have been addressed by Gatewood either 
through contact with the Plaintiff's medical providers to determine her level of 
impairment or appointment of a guardian ad litem. In the alternative, Gatewood 
should have advised Judge Day of the recent hospitalization so that a continuance 
could have been granted to give the Plaintiff additional time to process these issues 
or for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.3 
While Judge McLaughlin's finding addressed Ms. Stephen's "state of mind" during the 
divorce proceedings, that finding is relevant to this case. Unless Ms. Stephen's medical situation 
had changed since 2005, which the Defendants failed to establish below, then Ms. Stephen 
continued to need a guardian. 
Although Sallaz below could have pursued a Rule 35 mental examination, to which the 
Defendants clearly were entitled, they did not. Nor did Sallaz present any medical evidence to 
oppose or rebut the evidence Ms. Stephen presented at trial. 
2. See, RespondenllCross-Appellant's 12/22/09 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, document 4 - Order 
Granting appointment as gnardian ad litem. 
3. Conrt's Findings of Facts, p. 9. 
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Sallaz also claims "the guardian ad litem's participation at trial was deemed unnecessary.,,4 
Prior to trial, the Defendants filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude Mr. Wallace from 
testifying, and that motion was discussed at the pre-trial conference on August 8, 2008. The 
Defendants were concerned that referring to Mr. Wallace during the trial as a guardian in front of 
the jury would lead the jury to automatically conclude Ms. Stephen had a mental condition during 
the prior divorce action. Ms. Stephen's counsel confirmed that he did not intend to call Mr. 
Wallace as a witness, and the parties agreed that neither Ms. Stephen nor any witness could 
conunent about that issue. The Court concluded that Mr. Wallace could "watch and attend, and 
that sort of thing .... " (TR., p. 64, L1. 17-25, p. 65, L1. 1-19.) 
At trial, Mr. Wallace appeared and asked to be excused from the trial, as he was not a 
witness, and as Ms. Stephen's trial counsel would be there to determine if an issue needing the 
guardian's input arose. Mr. Wallace also confirmed there were economics involved and he was 
trying to reduce the costs for his services. (TR., p. 100, L1. 21-25, p. 101, L1. 1-22.) 
None of the Defendants objected to Mr. Wallace's request, which appeared reasonable 
under the circumstances. Mr. Wallace was not going to testify as a witness, and there was no need 
for Mr. Wallace to sit in the Courtroom during the trial, day after day, when he was not allowed to 
participate. Moreover, Ms. Stephen's trial counsel was making all strategic and tactical decisions 
during the trial, so Mr. Wallace's input would have been unnecessary. Moreover, in the unlikely 
event during trial that Mr. Wallace's input was necessary; for example, the Defendants had made 
an offer to settle, trial counsel could have contacted Mr. Wallace by phone. 
4. Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 15. 
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Mr. Wallace's charges were also reasonable. Mr. Wallace's' detailed billing confirm that 
he was involved in the case for approximately 18 months, and during that time he billed an 
average ofless than 2.5 hours per month. Additionally, the Clerk's Record of Action substantiates 
the Defendants aggressively contested many issues pre-trial, and Mr. Wallace was required to 
review these pleadings and continue to assess the viability of the Plaintiff's case. Finally, when 
Judge McLaughlin appointed Mr. Wallace, he knew Mr. Wallace was an attorney, but did not 
impose any restrictions on what fees Mr. Wallace could charge, and Mr. Wallace charged his 
normal hourly rate. 
Contrary to Sallaz' arguments on appeal, the record establishes the costs for the guardian 
ad litem were necessary, exceptional, and that Mr. Wallace's charges were reasonable. 
"So Tlille District Court Did Not Reaclill Its Decision Denying Guardian Ad Litem Costs By 
An Exercise I()f Reason. 
Judge McLaughlin ruled, when denying Ms. Stephen's request for costs incurred to pay her 
court-ordered guardian, Ms. Stephen failed to itemize Mr. Wallace's fees. Judge McLaughlin also 
stated his assumption that Mr. Wallace's involvement was "peripheral at best." 
Here, the Plaintiff requests $7,500 for the guardian ad litem fee of Robert 
Wallace. The Court will decline to award this foe because the Plaintiffhas not 
presented a billing or other document setting forth a specific itemization of the fees 
that constitute $7,500 charged by Mr. Wallace. Rule 54(d)(5) provides that the 
prevailing party must itemize each claimed expense. Without evidence establishing 
the reasonableness and legitimacy of a $7,500 guardian ad litem fee, the Plaintiff 
has not met her burden of showing that this cost was reasonably incurred and 
should in the interests of justice be assessed against the Defendants. Therefore, the 
Court lacks the specificity and basis on which to make an award for the guardian ad 
litem fee. In any event, it appears that Mr. Wallace's involvement in this case was 
peripheral at best. (R., p. 64, LL. 24-25, and p. 65, LL. 1-9.) (Emphasis added) 
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In support of her timely motion to reconsider, Ms. Stephen filed Mr. Wallace's affidavit 
and attached detailed billings confirming and corroborating his charges. Judge McLaughlin then 
responded that nothing submitted would have established a basis to change his mind. "There is 
nothing in the affidavits submitted that is new or additional evidence upon which the Court can 
find a basis to reconsider the Amended Judgment filed by the Court along with the Memorandum 
Decision of February 9, 2009." (R., p. 80.) 
Sallaz appears to argue that as Judge McLaughlin stated in his Memorandum Decision 
denying Ms. Stephen's motion to reconsider he had reviewed Mr. Wallace's affidavit, that Ms. 
Stephen had no basis for arguing that Judge McLaughlin literally "refused to consider the 
additional evidence." However, that was not her argument. 
Ms. Stephen was arguing that considering Mr. Wallace's affidavit, in which he testified 
and confirmed that his involvement for over 18 months in the case was substantial, and Mr. 
Wallace's detailed and thorough confirmation of the time he spent on the case, when compared 
with the criteria upon which Judge McLaughlin based his first decision; no billing records, and his 
assumption that Mr. Wallace's involvement was "peripheral," the reasonable conclusion that Ms. 
Stephen stated in her brief was Judge McLaughlin figuratively "refused to consider the additional 
evidence." 
"When examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether 
the trial court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of 
this discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available 
to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 
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204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009). 
The reality is Ms. Stephen did provide the specific and detailed information the Court 
requested, and even after the Court confirmed it did not expect Mr. Wallace to work for free, the 
Court disregarded the detailed information and refused to award a single dime for these costs. 
Based on these facts, it does not appear that Judge McLaughlin reached his decision by an exercise 
of reason to deny Ms. Stephen's request for compensation of the $7500.00 she was charged by the 
guardian he ordered her to obtain. 
Co Ms. Stepihtelill Was Elilltitied To JUtorney Fees Below. 
Although Sallaz argues Ms. Stephen did not specifically request attorney fees according to 
I.C. § 12-120(3), he fails to establish why that is relevant as the District Court's ultimately 
concluded that the case did not involve a "commercial transaction." 
There are two clear "threshold" issue when considering the application ofI.C. § 12-
120(3). Sallaz correctly cites the first; "the existence of a commercial transaction," but omits the 
equally important criteria that the party entitled to fees has to have prevailed in the action. 
Additionally, while Sallaz argues a party has to make a specific request for "attorney fees under 
the statute," he fails to establish that criteria is applicable where the Trial Court decides the 
threshold issues that no commercial transaction existed or that neither party prevailed thereby 
negating application onc. § 12-120(3) to any party. In other words, Sallaz fails to cite any 
authority for the proposition that a party has to file what would be essentially a frivolous motion 
and demand attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3) after a Court has ruled neither party 
prevailed or that the case does not involve a commercial transaction. 
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As Ms. Stephen argued previously, had the Court below rnled that although the case 
involved a commercial transaction and attomey fees were available in a legal malpractice case to 
the prevailing party, it was denying Sallaz' claim for attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), 
because he had not prevailed, then obviously, Ms. Stephen would have moved to amend her claim 
for attorney fees. However, as the District Court ruled the entire case did not involve a 
"commercial transaction," even after this Court released its decision in City of McCall v. Buxton, 
146 Idaho 656, 201 P.2d 629 (2009), then no party asserting a claim according to I.C. § 12-120(3) 
would have been entitled to attorney fees below. 
Sallaz also condescendingly argues; "Obviously the attomeys with the Moore Smith fum 
were perceptive enough to assert a claim for § 12-120(3) attomey fees in the Buxton case based 
upon the 2007 Blimka decision."s The argument is somewhat hypocritical as although Sallaz 
identified I.C. § 12-120(3) in his motion, he failed to support the claims with argument or any case 
citation. IfSallaz believed Blimka v. MY Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723,152 P.3d 594 
(2007) provided a basis for attomey fees, as he argues now, then he should have cited and argued 
Blimpka below. Sallaz' argument also iguores the fact that despite the Blimpka and Buxton 
decisions, Judge McLaughlin ultimately concluded that this legal malpractice case did not involve 
a "commercial transaction." 
Upon appeal, if the issue presented is whether the case involved a commercial transaction 
or whether any party prevailed, the Appellate Court has authority upon deciding that issue to 
remand the case to the rnling Judge to award attorney fees as this Court did in Shore v. Peterson, 
5. Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 19. 
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146 Idaho 903, 204 P.3d 111 (2009). The appeal in Shore arose after the trial court determined 
that neither party prevailed below. After deciding that issue, and finding Peterson had prevailed, 
this Court ruled that on remand, as the case involved a commercial transaction and Peterson was 
the prevailing party, and as the application ofLC. § 12-120(3) was mandatory, the district court 
was compelled to award Peterson attorney fees on remand. 
Because Peterson was the prevailing party below, the case is remanded for the 
district court to determine his award of costs as a matter of right and discretionary 
costs, if any. Additionally, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party in an action to recover on a note or other commercial 
transaction. I.C. § 12-120 (3); RECD Constr. Co. v. J-U-R Eng's, Inc., 145 Idaho 
719,726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008). Therefore, because Peterson is the prevailing 
party, the district court must determine the amount of his attorney fee award under 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3). (Emphasis added) 
If this Court reverses Judge McLaughlin's ruling that this legal malpractice case did not 
involve a commercial transaction, and the Court upholds Judge McLaughlin's determination that 
Ms. Stephen was the prevailing party below, Ms. Stephen respectfully requests this Court order 
the District Court to award her attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3) on remand. 
D. As Oille Party SOlllght Attoll'llley Fees Uillder I.C. § 12-120(3), The Request Triggered 
Eilltitiemeillt Til Recover Attomey Fees To The Prevamllllg Party. 
Sallaz' acknowledges the validity of Ms. Stephen's "triggering" argument - that a party is 
entitled to recover attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) if another party "triggers" application of 
that statute to the case by raising a claim for fees under this statute, but then misstates the decision 
in Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 218 (2001). 
Sallaz contends, "[b Jut any possibility that these cases could have stood for the proposition 
asserted by Stephen on this appeal was expressly rejected in a subsequent decision, Great Plains 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 9 
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001) where 
the Court declared that, 'To the extent that Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 
805, 808, 892 P.2d 480, 483 (1995) may be read to mandate an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party when the other party has claimed fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), that 
interpretation is disavowed' .,,6 However, it is unclear why Sallaz omits the very next sentence in 
the opinion, which clarifies the Court's intent. When the Great Plains Equipment, Inc. decision is 
read in its entirety, Ms. Stephen's analysis was correct. 
There must be a commercial transaction between the parties for attorney fees to be 
awarded. To the extent that Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 
805, 808, 892 P.2d 480, 483 (1995) may be read to mandate an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party when the other party has claimed fees pursuant to I.C. s 
12-120(3), that interpretation is disavowed. A prevailing party may rely on I.C. s 
12-120(3) if pled by another party for recovery of attorney fees int is warranted 
under the statute. "[A] court is not required to award reasonable attorney fees every 
time a commercial transaction is connected with a case." Bingham v. Montane 
Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 426, 987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999)(citing Ervin 
Construction Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993». 
(Emphasis added) 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 
218,223 (2001). 
Contrary to Sallaz' contention, the next sentence following Sallaz' quote, indicates the 
Court was not "disavowing" anything, but clarifYing that the Magic Lantern opinion did not 
mandate the application ofLC. § 12-120(3) in every situation. It is also clear that the Great Plains 
Equipment, Inc. Court was reaffirming the triggering analysis followed in Magic Lantern, not 
rejecting the analysis as Sallaz appears to argue. 
6. Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 18. 
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E. Ms. Stepihtelllllis Not AsJkJillllg Tihte Twi!llH Court To AW!llwd AUoll'lllley Fees SU(JJ SpoUite. 
Sallaz also argue that a Court cannot award attorney fees sua sponte and cites Bingham v. 
Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,423-24,987 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (1999), but fails to 
argue why Bingham should apply here, as the attorney fee statute at issue in that case was not I.C. 
§ 12-120(3). 
Furthennore, where the clear language of the statute mandates an award of attorney fees, 
and therefore, the Judge lacks discretion, the Judge would not be awarding attorney fees sua 
sponte. Additionally, where the clear language of the statute compels an award of attorney fees to 
the prevailing party in litigation involving a commercial transaction, a party to the litigation would 
have actual notice that attorney fees would be awarded if they did not prevail. Also, as discussed 
in the "triggering" analysis, a party who seeks attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3) is 
arguing application of that statute to the case, not just to their particular claim. Either the case 
involves a commercial transaction or it does not, so resolution of that issue if raised by a single 
party, applies to all parties. It therefore would be somewhat disingenuous for a party who raised 
I.C. § 12-120(3) as did Sallaz, then to claim some prejUdice because the Court awarded attorney 
fees to another party to the litigation. Bingham is also distinguishable as the Court awarded 
attorney fees based on an attorney fee statute no party had raised. 
In addition, I.C. § 12-120(3), still requires a party seeking attorney fees to follow the filing 
procedure mandated by IRCP 54(e)(5). 
12-120 ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS. 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
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negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. (Emphasis 
added) 
The responding party therefore is afforded an opportunity to object to a claim when the 
prevailing party files the requisite memorandum of costs. The responding party also has the 
opportunity to object to a specific finding that a certain party prevailed or that the case involved a 
commercial transaction in the same marmer as a party would seek review post-trial or post-
decision of any other factual finding or ruling. 
While Ms. Stephen did not identify I.C. § 12-120(3) for the reasons already stated, as "a 
prevailing party may rely on I.C. § 12-120(3) if pled by another party for recovery of attorney 
fees," and as attorney fees in legal malpractice cases are "warranted under the statute," and as 
Sallaz sought fees according to I.e. § 12-120(3), but was not a prevailing party, then Judge 
McLaughlin erred when he did not grant attorney fees to Ms. Stephen following the Buxton 
decision. 
u. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Ms. Stephen respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's denial of 
her claim for discretionary costs for the fees she paid to her guardian ad litem, who the District 
Court appointed to represent her. 
2. Ms. Stephen respectfully requests that this Court rule Ms. Stephan was entitled to 
attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3) after City o/McCall v. Buxton, as she was the 
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prevailing party in her legal malpractice case. 
3. Finally, Ms. Stephen respectfully requests this Court award her costs and attorney 
fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of April, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
<~/~ /' ~ , -
EriC<1C Clark, for the PlaintifflRespondenti 
Cross Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of April 2010, I caused to be served in the 
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Gary L. Quigley 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1296 
Meridian, ID 83680 
US Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Respondent Sallaz and 
"f6fCross-Respondents Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD., and Scott Gatewood 
Eric R. Clark 
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